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Gillian Demeyere* The Contract of Employment at the Supreme
Court of Canada: Employee Protection and
the Presumption of Employer Freedom
This article critically examines the Supreme Court of Canada's treatment of the
contract of employment in its wrongful dismissal jurisprudence over the last 25
years, with the aim of challenging the view that only by exempting the contract
of employment from the ordinary workings of contract doctrine or by resorting to
public policy considerations can the common law of dismissal provide adequate
protection for employees. The Court's jurisprudence reveals a commitment to
what this paper calls the presumption of employer freedom, a view of the contract
of employment which has its origins in the status-based master and servant
relationship and which continues to permeate the common law of wrongful
dismissal. This paper offers a more straightforwardly contract-based account of
these same entitlements, grounding them not in policy but instead in the work-for-
wages exchange at the core of the contract of employment.
L'article fait un examen critique de la fagon dont, au cours des 25 dernieres
ann6es, la Cour supr6me du Canada a traite le contrat d'emploi dans ses arr~ts
sur le cong6diement injustifie. L'article vise 6 contester I'opinion que ce n'est
qu'en soustrayant le contrat d'emploi a I'application de la th6orie des contrats
ou en recourant a des considerations de politique publique que la common law
sur le cong~diement offre une protection adequate pour les employes. Les arr~ts
de la Cour revelent une determination a appliquer ce que I'auteure appelle la
, prdsomption de libert6 de I'employeur ,, opinion sur le contrat d'emploi dont
Iorigine remonte a la relation entre maitre et serviteur fondee sur le statut social
qui continue de se manifester dans la common law sur le congediement injustifie.
L'article presente une vision plus directement fondee sur le modele de contrat
des m~mes droits, Iarrimant non sur la politique, mais sur le travail fait contre
r6mun~ration au cour m~me du contrat d'emploi.
* Associate Professor and Daryl T Bean Research Chair in Law and Women's Studies and
Feminist Research. Thanks to Dennis Klimchuk, Denise Reaume, Kerry Rittich and Stephen Smith
for helpful comments on drafts of this work.
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Introduction
Otto Kahn-Freund famously identified the contract of employment as the
"corner-stone" of the modern employment relationship.' R. W. Rideout
later declared this cornerstone to have a "core of rubble," the common
law of contract being ill-suited, without endless distortion, to govern
the employment relationship. 2 Kahn-Freund himself saw the contract
of employment, although the legal foundation of the employment
relationship, as no less a "mask, ' 3 a "fiction"4 and a "figment of the legal
mind."5 More recently, Bob Hepple has added "riddle"6 to the list and
Bruno Veneziani has added "faqade." 7 Hugh Collins has accused the
contract of employment of being "dysfunctional" 8 and Simon Deakin has
cautioned that the employment relationship is not "a contract in the normal
sense."
9
Canadian courts too have frequently noted the special nature of the
contract of employment, pointing to its "many characteristics that set it
1. 0 Kahn-Freund, "Legal Framework" in Allan Flanders & HA Cleggs, eds, The System of
Industrial Relations in Great Britain: Its History, Law and Institutions (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1964) 42 at 45.
2. RW Rideout, "The Contract of Employment" (1966) 19:1 Current Leg Probs 11l at 111.
3. Paul Davies & Mark Freedland, Kahn-Freund s Labour and the Law, 3rd ed (London: Stevens &
Sons, 1983) at 24.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid at 18.
6. Bob Hepple, "Restructuring Employment Rights" (1986) 15:1 Indus LJ 69 at 71.
7. Bruno Veneziani, "The Evolution of the Contract of Employment" in Bob Hepple, ed, The
Making of Labour Lav in Europe: A Comparative Study of Nine Countries up to 1945 (New York:
Mansell Publishing, 1986) 31 at 71.
8. Hugh Collins, "Independent Contractors and the Challenge of Vertical Disintegration to
Employment Protection Laws" (1990) 10:30 Oxford J Leg Stud 353 at 369.
9. Simon Deakin, "Legal Origins of Wage Labour: The Evolution of the Contract of Employment
from Industrialisation to the Welfare State" in Linda Clarke, Peter de Gijsel & J6m Janssen, eds, The
Dynamics of Wage Relations in the New Europe (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002) 32 at
32.
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apart from the ordinary commercial contract."'" Perhaps most frequently
cited by our courts in support of the need for special consideration of
the uniqueness of the employment contract is Dickson C.J.'s observation,
almost 25 years ago, that "[w]ork is one of the most fundamental aspects in
a person's life, providing the individual with a means of financial support
and, as importantly, a contributory role in society. A person's employment
is an essential component of his or her sense of identity, self-worth
and emotional well-being."" Justice lacobucci, in a series of important
wrongful dismissal cases, 12 regularly invoked the former Chief Justice
Dickson's words, stressing the importance ofjudicial attentiveness to these
personal and sociological aspects of work, adding that "not only is work
fundamental to an individual's identity, but also.. .the manner in which
employment can be terminated is equally important."'13 In those cases,
lacobucci J. also emphasized the unequal balance of bargaining power
that most often marks the employment relationship and that underscores
the vulnerability of employees, particularly at the time of dismissal. Given
the special nature of work and the inequality in bargaining power that
places employees in a vulnerable position in relation to their employers,
he often reminded us, care must be taken in fashioning rules and principles
of law governing the contract of employment.
My aim in this paper is to critically examine the judicial treatment
of the contract of employment in the Supreme Court of Canada's
wrongful dismissal jurisprudence over the last two decades. In particular,
I set out to challenge the view, most explicitly found in lacobucci J.'s
judgments, that only by exempting the contract of employment from the
ordinary workings of contract doctrine or by resorting to public policy
considerations can the common law of dismissal provide adequate
protection for employees. I will examine three key employee-protecting
doctrines in the Canadian common law of wrongful dismissal: first, the
employee's default implied right to reasonable notice of dismissal under
an indefinite term contract; second, the common law doctrine of just
cause, which extends to employees protection from summary dismissal;
and third, the employer's implied duty to refrain from harsh and unfair
conduct in terminating the contract of employment. Each of these doctrines
have been justified by the Court on the basis of what most would regard
10. Wallace v United Grain Growers Ltd, [1997] 3 SCR 701 at para 91 [Wallace].
11. Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta), [1987] 1 SCR 313 at 368.
12. Machtinger v HOJ Industries Ltd, [1992] 1 SCR 986 [Machtinger]; Wallace, supra note 10;
McKinley v BC Tel, 2001 SCC 38, [2001] 2 SCR 161 [McKinley].
13. Machtinger, supra note 12 at 1002; cited in Wallace, supra note 10 at para 95 and McKinley,
supra note 12 at para 53.
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as extra-contractual considerations, most commonly on the grounds of the
personal and sociological importance of work and the desire to mitigate
the vulnerability of employees as a group. I will argue that those same
doctrines might alternatively be defended in purely contractual terms-
that is, they might instead be justified more narrowly in terms of the work-
for-wages exchange at the core of the contract of employment. 4 While
often in the Court's wrongful dismissal jurisprudence the contractual
foundation of the employment relationship seems to be regarded as an
obstacle to the recognition of important employee protections at common
law, I will propose how the contract of employment can alternatively be
seen as, far from an obstacle, instead the source of and justification for
these employee rights and protections at common law.
I will further argue that what has prevented the Court from recognizing
the contractual foundation of the employee's common law rights is a
commitment to what I will call the "presumption of employer freedom."
This presumption has its roots in the historical evolution of employment
from the status-based master and servant relationship to the modem
conception of the contract of employment and, as I will argue, continues
to permeate the common law of dismissal in Canada. The presumption of
employer freedom is, in effect, a lens through which the Court views the
contract of employment and which has the effect of distorting the parties'
rights and duties in a way that favours employers. Only when the contract
is viewed through the lens of the presumption of employer freedom do
the employee's law common rights and protections appear to be in need
of justification from outside the parties' contractual relationship. When
viewed in this way by someone like lacobucci J. who was not only willing,
but seemed to prefer, to base the Court's (pro-employee) decisions on
extra-contractual grounds, thereby making explicit the relevance of public
policy to matters of employment, the presumption of employer freedom
is not worrisome for employees. But what is worrisome is that the
presumption of employer freedom threatens to deny employees important
protections, when a putatively straight-forward "contractual" approach to
the employment relationship is adopted. In its most recent jurisprudence,
following the retirement of lacobucci J. in 2004, there has been a discemable
move away from the policy-based decisions in wrongful dismissal law in
favour of a seemingly strictly contractual approach to the employment
relationship. As it turns out, there have been a handful of recent notable
14. The Supreme Court of Canada has recently endorsed the view that employment represents a
work-for-wages exchange, in Hydro-Qudbec v Syndicat des employ -e-s de techniques professionnelles
et de bureau d'Hydro-Qudbec, section locale 2000, 2008 SCC 43 at para 15, [2008] 2 SCR 561.
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victories for employers at the Supreme Court.I5 It is therefore tempting to
conclude that a strictly contract-based, as opposed to a broader policy-
based, approach to the employment relationship will inevitably favour the
interests of employers. My aim in this paper is to suggest, however, that
this need not be the case. The contract of employment can, itself, ground
and justify important protections for employees. While the employer-
employee relationship undoubtedly possesses characteristics that set it
apart from the typical commercial transaction, the contractual core of the
employment relationship-the work-for-wages exchange-can on its own
serve as the justificatory basis for the employee's common law rights and
protections. To see that, however, we must cease to view the contract of
employment through the lens of the presumption of employer freedom.
I will begin with a discussion of the presumption of employer freedom
and its origins in the status-based relationship of master and servant that
pre-dated the modem employment relationship's form as a species of
contract. I will then turn to consider the Supreme Court of Canada's recent
dismissal jurisprudence, in which the Court seems to have struggled to
reconcile employee entitlements at common law with the contractual nature
of the employer-employee relationship: the implied right to reasonable
notice of termination under an indefinite term contract in Machtinger v.
HOJ Industries,16 the implied right to.protection against unjust dismissal
in McKinley v. B.C. Tel,17 and the implied right to be treated fairly upon
termination of employment in Wallace v. United Grain Growers.18 The
majority opinion in each case, written by lacobucci J., subscribes to the
presumption of employer freedom, leaving the Court with only extra-
contractual and public policy considerations upon which to justify its
finding for the employee. In each case, I will suggest how the same
outcomes could be justified in purely contractual terms. To be clear, my
aim in offering a contract-based alternative to the majority's policy-based
decision in each of these cases is not to question the relevance of public
policy and extra-contractual considerations in matters of employment.
Rather, it is to offer an additional, and perhaps more doctrinally secure,
justification for the employee's entitlements at common law-one not
dependent on prevailing conceptions of fairness and sound public policy
15. Evans v Teamsters Local Union No 31, 2008 SCC 20, [2008] 1 SCR 661; Dunsmuir v New
Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190; Honda Canada Inc v Keays, 2008 SCC 39, [2008] 2 SCR
362 [Keays]. For a review of these cases, see Gillian Demeyere, "Developments in Employment Law:
The 2007-2008 Term" (2008) 43 SCLR (2d) 275. 1 will discuss Keays in more detail later in this paper.
16. Machtinger, supra note 12.
17. McKinley, supra note 12.
18. Wallace, supra note 10.
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which can shift and change over time, and instead grounded in basic
principles of contract law.
I. The presumption of employer freedom
The presumption of employer freedom can be traced to the employer's
implied contractual right of managerial prerogative at common law as it
has evolved from the status-based master and servant relationship. The
employer's right of managerial prerogative, a default implied term at
common law, gives the employer the sole legal authority to manage the
labour process in its workplace. The employer's managerial prerogative
is buttressed by an implied obligation on the part of the employee to
serve the employer loyally, a duty often referred to simply as the duty
to serve.'gThe employee's duty to serve is correlative to the employer's
right of managerial prerogative but the duty does not merely stand for the
idea that the employee must submit to the employer's right to control the
work. The employee's implied duty to serve grants the employer not only
the unilateral authority to set the terms and conditions under which the
work will be performed, but also the unilateral authority to set the scope of
managerial prerogative-that is, the right to set what counts as an exercise
of that authority. In other words, because it demands the employees'
obedience and deference to the employer's authority, the implied duty to
serve effectively affords the employer freedom to determine whether its
exercise of control falls within the scope of that right.
A few commentators have drawn attention to this hierarchical structure
created by the common law implied terms of managerial prerogative and
the employee's duty to serve. Selznick, for instance, has observed that
[b]y the end of the nineteenth century the employment contract had
become a very special sort of contract-in large part a legal device for
guaranteeing to management the unilateral power to make rules and
exercise discretion. For this reason we call it the prerogative contract.20
19. The British Columbia Court of Appeal described the effect of these two implied terms in the
following passage:
[A]n employer has a right to determine how his business shall be conducted. He may lay
down any procedures he thinks advisable so long as they are neither contrary to law, nor
dishonest, nor dangerous to the health of the employees and are within the ambit of the
job for which any particular employee was hired. It is not for the employee nor for the
court to consider the wisdom of the procedures. The employer is the boss and it is an
essential implied term of every employment contract that, subject to the limitations I have
expressed, the employee must obey the orders given to him.
Stein v British Columbia (Housing Management Commission) (1992), 65 BCLR (2d) 181 (CA).
20. Philip Selznick, La, Society, and Industrial Justice (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969)
at 135 [emphasis in original].
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And he continues,
[W]hat is the legal meaning of the norm that the employer may set the
rules of plant behavior? Is the employer the sole judge of whether his
rules are arbitrary or exceed the scope of his authority? Ideally, even
under contract doctrine, the employer might be granted the right to make
rules, but he would not have the unrestricted right to decide whether the
rules he has made are consistent with the contract. But the prerogative
contract gives to the employer just such authority.21
Selznick explains that the prerogative contract, that is, the contract of
employment shaped as it is by the implied terms of managerial prerogative
and the employee's duty to serve, represents a "marriage of old master-
servant notions to an apparently uncompromising contractualism. ' 22 But,
as he notes, the master-servant model was only partially incorporated
into the contract of employment. In managerial prerogative, the employer
inherited the traditional authority of the master but, as Selznick puts it, that
authority was "stripped of the sense of personal duty, commitment, and
responsibility that once accompanied it" 23 such that, with the transition
from status to contract, employers were not held to the same kinds of duties
and responsibilities that masters had historically owed to their servants.
24
Correspondingly, employees .no longer enjoyed the benefit of managerial
benevolence that servants had once enjoyed and yet, through the common
law implied term of the duty to serve, continued to owe their employers
essentially thesame duty of obedience and loyalty.
According to Alan Fox, this selective borrowing from the law of master
and servant was deliberately designed to favour employers. For Fox, the
contractual model of the employment relationship, which envisions the
relationship to be shaped by mutual agreement, represented an incipient
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid at 136.
23. Ibid.
24. Simon Deakin writes,
Neither did the concept of mutuality extend to the continuation of the master's traditional
obligations of care under the service relationship... .Old authorities, to the effect that a
master had an obligation to maintain a servant or to provide them with medical care and
expenses in the event of sickness or injury, were largely overturned [in the nineteenth
century.]
Deakin, supra note 9 at 35. As Sanford M Jacoby puts it,
One result of this formal approach to the employment contract was the demise of the
familial model in master and servant law. The courts developed a new common law rule
that masters did not have to provide medical or surgical care for their servants... The
other obligations of the master, such as moral indoctrination and Christian training, were
"increasingly neglected" by employers and the courts since these now were viewed as
"encumbrances upon a contractual arrangement of limited purpose."
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threat to the entrepreneur's "unfettered command over labour resources."25
In order to preserve the "organizational strength of the business enterprise,"
he writes, the common law courts "imported into the employment contract
a set of implied terms reserving full authority of direction and control to
the employer. 2
6
Against the background of these employer-favouring remnants of
the master and servant relationship, courts applied what Selznick calls
an "uncompromising contractualism ' '27 to the contract of employment.
With the hierarchical structure created by the implied terms of managerial
prerogative and the employee's duty to serve in place, it was then 'presumed
that each party would take care of his own interests and provide for them in
a freely bargained agreement.' 2 Of course, the employer's interests were
already well taken care of by the broad right of managerial prerogative
and the right to demand obedience and loyalty from its employees. It
is hard to imagine what rights-beyond the unilateral authority and
unfettered discretion to manage the workplace-an employer might be
pressed to bargain for. Indeed, the employee, already under a duty of
obedience and loyalty to her employer, would have little else in the way
of a positive obligation to offer the employer. While the employer's rights
and the employee's duties are nearly fully captured by the implied terms
of managerial prerogative and the duty to serve, the employee's rights
and the employer's duties, in contrast, are left to be negotiated as express
terms of their agreement. The result is that the employee's rights under the
contract are taken to be limited to those found in the express terms and, in
turn, the duties that the employer owes its employees are limited to those
duties expressly agreed to by the parties. 29
It is this feature of the common law of employment that I call the
presumption of employer freedom. Under the presumption of employer
freedom, the employer is presumed to enjoy the authority to set the
terms and conditions of employment subject only to the express terms
of the contract and the employer's duties to the employee are presumed
25. Alan Fox, Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations (London: Faber and Faber, 1974)
at 187 [Fox, Beyond Contract]. See also Alan Fox, History and Heritage: The Social Origins of the
British Industrial Relations System (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985).
26. Fox, Beyond Contract, supra note 25 at 187, 188. As John V Orth writes: "[dIefanged and
domesticated, contract could be safely relied upon to define labor relations": John V Orth, "Contract
and the Common Law" in Harry N Scheiber, ed, The State and Freedom of Contract (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1998) 44 at 64.
27. Selznick, supra note 20 at 136.
28. Ibid.
29. As Selnick puts it, "[tlhe terms of the agreement, not the law of the employment contract, would
have to be relied on for substantive justice in the plant": ibid.
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to be limited to those expressly agreed to by the parties. The employer's
freedom, in short, is taken to be limited only by the express terms of the
parties' agreement. Absent an express term in the contract of employment
restricting the employer's freedom to manage the workplace in a certain
respect, the employer is presumed to be free to manage as it best sees
fit. The presumption of employer freedom thus invites the -court to see
employee-protecting doctrines, such as the employee's implied common
law entitlement to reasonable notice of termination of her employment,
as extra-contractual benefits justifiable only on grounds external to the
work-for-wages exchange. I turn now to review several key recent cases
in the Supreme Court of Canada's jurisprudence on wrongful dismissal, in
order to expose the Court's commitment to the presumption of employer
freedom and to consider how this approach to the contract of employment
has shaped the common law of dismissal over the years.
II. Reasonable notice of termination
Machtinger afforded the Supreme Court of Canada the opportunity
to consider the basis of an employee's entitlement at common law to
reasonable notice of the termination of their employment. The appellants,
Machtinger and Lefebvre, had been employed by the respondent car
dealership for seven years when they were dismissed without cause
and without notice. Both employees had signed standard form contracts
of employment according to which Machtinger would be entitled to no
notice of termination of his contract and Lefebvre would be entitled to two
weeks' notice. The issue at trial in this case was whether the contracts of
employment rebutted the presumption at common law that an employee is
entitled to reasonable notice of termination of his or her employment. Both
contracts violated the minimum standards for notice of termination under
the Ontario Employment Standards Act. The Supreme Court declared the
notice provisions null and void and awarded both employees common
law damages in lieu of reasonable notice. In the result, Machtinger was
awarded damages equal to seven months notice and Lefebvre damages
equal to seven and a half months notice.
In his majority decision, lacobucci J., quoting from Mark Freedland's
leading work, explained that a contract of employment "in the absence
of evidence to the contrary is one of employment for an indefinite period
terminable by either party upon reasonable notice, but only upon reasonable
notice."3 The amount of notice to which an employee is entitled will
30. Machtinger, supra note 12 at 13, citing MR Freedland, The Contract of Employment (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1976) at 153. The concept of reasonable notice in Canadian employment law dates
back to the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Bain vAnderson & Co (1898), 28 SCR 481.
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depend on the facts of the case, including the employee's length of service,
the employee's position, the employee's age at the time of dismissal and the
availability of similar employment.3 Justice lacobucci did not, however,
explain why under an indefinite tern contract the parties are implicitly
bound to provide reasonable notice in order to lawfully terminate the
contract. He noted counsel's "considerable attention in argument before
[the court] to the law governing the implication of contractual terms,
and specifically to the relevance of the intention of the parties to the
implication of a term of reasonable notice of termination in employment
contracts."32 But, Iacobucci J. explained, the issue raised in this case could
be resolved on "narrower grounds."33 Those grounds, it seems, are what
he labels as "policy considerations."34 Given the importance of work to
society and in light of the inferior market power of most employees, he
reasoned, it is necessary to provide "protection for employees."35 Holding
that the common law presumption of reasonable notice has not been
rebutted if the contract of employment fails to comply with the minimum
notice provisions under employment standards legislation would provide
employers with an "incentive to comply with the Act."36
Whatever its rationale, the entitlement to any notice of termination
makes Canadian employees better off than American employees for
whom the default rule is employment-at-will.37 Under the presumption
of employment-at-will, an employer may dismiss an employee without
notice and for any reason. American law, like Canadian law, conceives of
the employment relationship as a contract, and for Richard Epstein, for
example, it is because the employment relationship is a contract that the
31. Machtinger, supra note 12 at 999. These factors, used in assessing the amount of reasonable
notice of termination to which an employee, are set out in Bardal v Globe & Mail Ltd(1960), 24 DLR
(2d) 140 (Ont H Ct J) at 145.
32. Machtinger, supra note 12 at 998.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid at 1002.
35. Ibid at 1004.
36. Ibid.
37. Richard A Epstein, "In Defense of the Contract At Will" (1984) 51:4 U Chicago L Rev 947. On
most accounts, the American presumption of employment-at-will dates back to HG Wood, A Treatise
on the Law of the Master and Servant Covering the Relation, Duties and Liabilities of Employers and
Employees, 2nd ed (San Francisco: Bancroft-Whitney, 1886). See Jay M Feinman, "The Development
of the Employment at will Rule" (1976) 20:2 Am J Leg Hist 118 and Jacoby, supra note 24. While the
contract of employment has its roots as a status-based relationship in both English and American law,
the legal presumptions that govern the modem contract differ in the two jurisdictions. I do not in this
paper attempt to account for or explain the evolution of the different presumptions, though of course
different legal and political forces were at work in each country to shape the evolution of the law. See
Feinman and Jacoby (cited in this note) and Fox, Beyond Contract, supra note 25.
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default rule should be employment-at-will.38 Where the contract does not
specify a fixed term of employment, Epstein argues, it must be presumed that
either party can terminate the contract at-will-that is, without providing
notice or reasons for the termination. For Epstein, the employment-at-will
doctrine respects both the principle of freedom of contract and the rules
governing the interpretation of contracts. Freedom of contract, he argues,
requires that both parties be free to terminate the contract.39And, he adds,
where a contract does not provide for an entitlement to notice oftermination,
principles of contractual interpretation require that no entitlement be
conferred, out of respect for the obvious intentions of the parties."a Thus
while under both American and Canadian law, the employment relationship
is conceived of as a contract, the two jurisdictions subscribe to opposite
presumptions: for Canadians, a presumption of employee entitlement to
reasonable notice of termination and for Americans, a presumption of no
entitlement to notice of termination.
Under the status-based master and servant relationship, masters were
generally legally obligated to provide servants with notice of termination 1.4
With the employment relationship's transition from status to contract,
American employment law diverged from English law which continued
to read into contracts of employment an obligation to provide notice of
termination. 2 So it might be said that the difference between Canadian
and American law on the question of an employee's implied entitlement
to notice of termination reveals that the Canadian law has not yet fully
embraced the contractual model, or perhaps that it has returned to a status-
based conception of the employment relationship. The question, in other
words, is whether the difference between the two jurisdictions suggests
that the Canadian worker's entitlement to notice of termination goes
beyond the entitlements to which an employee is entitled in virtue of the
promises exchanged under the contract.
38. Epstein, supra note 37. See also Mayer G Freed & Daniel D Polsby, "Just Cause for Termination
Rules and Economic Efficiency" (1989) 38:4 Emory LJ 1097. Defenders of the at-will presumption
frequently point to the employee's parallel freedom to terminate the contract without notice in support
of the presumption. Richard A Posner, "Hegel and Employment at Will: A Comment" (1989) 10:5-6
Cardozo L Rev 1625 at 1627, for example, writes: "Employment at will happens to be the logical
terminus on the road that begins with slavery and makes intermediate stops at serfdom, indentured
servitude, forced servitude, and guild restrictions. That should be a point in its favor."
39. Epstein, supra note 37 at 953-955.
40. Ibdat 951.
41. English common law presumed that employment for an indefinite period was for one year, in the
absence of custom or evidence to the contrary: see William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Lmvs of
England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979) vol 1. at 413. Courts subsequently qualified the
rule by allowing termination after reasonable notice. See Feinman, supra note 37 at 119-122.
42. Jacoby, supra note 24.
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Much depends on whether we characterize the employee's entitlement
to reasonable notice as a benefit or as an absence of a burden, and whether
we characterize the employer's duty to provide reasonable notice of
termination as a burden or as an absence of a benefit. The presumption of
employer freedom encourages us to think of an employee's entitlement to
notice of termination as a(n) (extra-contractual) benefit and fhe employer's
duty to provide notice as a(n) (extra-contractual) burden. Having not
expressly agreed to provide notice of termination, the employer, with the
help of the presumption of freedom, is presumed not to owe any such
duty. To hold the employer to an implied obligation to provide reasonable
notice of termination of an indefinite term contract is therefore to hold
the employer to an obligation that it did not agree to owe, and one that,
according to Epstein, is inconsistent with the obvious intentions of the
parties.
The parties' intentions under an indefinite term contract seem obvious,
however, only if one subscribes to what I have called the presumption of
employer freedom. Where the parties have not specified a fixed term for
the contract, it seems fair to say that both have agreed that it will be of
indefinite duration and indeed, this is the view taken by both American and
Canadian employment law. For one party to then be able to unilaterally
terminate the contract at a later date, without cause and without notice
to the other party-as the doctrine of employment-at-will permits-is to
allow that party unilaterally to set an essential term of their agreement,
namely, the duration of the contract. In other words, to allow an employer
(or an employee) to terminate the contract at will is to allow the employer
(or the employee) to effectively turn an indefinite term contract into a
fixed term contract and to thus hold the employee (or the employer in the
case of termination by the employee) to a term to which she did not agree
to be bound. This is not because an indefinite term contract is presumed
to permanently bind the parties but because their agreement manifests no
consensus whatever on the duration of the agreement.
Consider the case of an employer who unilaterally terminates an
indefinite term contract five years into the relationship. At the contract's
inception, the employee did not agree to a five-year term. Holding the
employer to a duty to provide reasonable notice of termination of
an indefinite term contract can be understood as an attempt to put the
employee in the position she would have been had she, at the time of the
contract's inception, agreed to, in this example, a fixed term contract of five
years duration. The notice period affords the employee the opportunity to
seek alternative employment, something that presumably she would have
done (or at least have been aware that she ought to do) if she desired
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to continue to be gainfully employed. Put another way, the notice period
makes it possible to conduct her affairs as though she had agreed to the
employer's demand for a five-year contract. Mutual agreement on the term
of the contract is constructed retroactively by extending to the employee
an entitlement to a period of notice in which she can conduct her affairs
as though she had voluntarily agreed with the employer that the contract
would terminate on the date desired by the employer.43
Although once grounded in notions of status, the duty to provide notice
of termination under an indefinite term contract can thus alternatively be
grounded in the contractual foundation of the employment relationship.
The Canadian presumption appears to impose duties not grounded in
the.reciprocal exchange of contractual promises under an indefinite term
contract only if, as Epstein does in his defence of employment-at-will,
one presumes that to hold an employer to a duty that it has not expressly
agreed to owe is to confer on the employee an extra-contractual benefit.
In Machtinger, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada seems
to have subscribed to just that presumption. Rather than derive the
employee's right to reasonable notice of termination from the absence
of her consent to the employer's demand that the contract terminate at a
certain date, the Court in Machtinger seems to have taken the absence of
the employer's express promise to provide notice of termination to leave
the Court with only public policy justifications upon which to base the
employee's entitlement. By viewing the contract of employment through
the lens of the presumption of employer freedom and thus holding the
employer's contractual duties and the employee's contractual rights to be
limited to those that the parties have expressly agreed to, the Supreme
Court failed to appreciate that the contract of employment itself can
ground the employee's right to notice of termination and the employer's
duty to provide such notice. Instead, it seems that the Court could only see
in the employee's common law right of notice of termination the conferral
of an extra-contractual benefit to the employee rather than the denial of an
extra-contractual benefit to the employer.
III. The law of summary dismissal
In McKinley, the Supreme Court considered the common law doctrine of
just cause. McKinley was a chartered accountant employed by B.C. Tel
for nearly 17 years when in 1993 he began to experience hypertension, a
43. While in this example it is the employer who must provide notice of termination, the same
reasoning supports the employee's corresponding obligation under Canadian employment law to
provide reasonable notice to his/her employer of his/her intention to resign from his/her employment
under an indefinite term contract: Oxman v Dustbane Enterprises Ltd(1988), 23 CCEL 157 (Ont CA).
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condition that was initially brought under control through medication and a
short leave of absence from work. In 1994, his condition worsened and on
the advice of his physician, McKinley took another leave of absence. Three
months into this second leave, McKinley was advised that his employment
with B.C. Tel was terminated. He commenced an action for wrongful
dismissal. In its defence, the employer argued that because McKinley had
been dishonest about his medical condition and its treatment, the employer
had just cause to terminate his employment without notice. Specifically,
the employer alleged, McKinley had deliberately withheld information
regarding his physician's recommendation of a particular medication that
was not prescribed but could have enabled him to return to work without
incurring any health risks.
At trial, the jury found in favour of McKinley, awarding him general,
special and aggravated damages. The British Columbia Court of Appeal set
aside the jury's award and ordered a new trial on the grounds that the trial
judge had erred in instructing the jury that McKinley's alleged dishonesty
would merit dismissal only if it was of a degree that was incompatible
with the employment relationship. According to the Court of Appeal, "as a
matter of law, all dishonesty within an employment relationship provides
just cause."' McKinley appealed.
The main issue before the Supreme Court was whether the employee's
dishonesty, in and of itself, necessarily gives rise to just cause for summary
dismissal. Justice lacobucci, writing for the unanimous Court, observed
that one line of Canadian authorities subscribed to a contextual approach
under which the nature and surrounding circumstances of the dishonest
conduct must be considered.4 5 The other line of cases held that dishonest
conduct, regardless of its degree or the circumstances in which it occurred,
is necessarily cause for an employee's dismissal.46 Justice Iacobucci then
proposed a test that in his view was consistent with both lines of authority.
He formulated the test variously as whether "the employee's dishonesty
gave rise to a breakdown in the employment relationship,"47 whether "the
dishonesty violates an essential condition of the employment contract, '48
whether the dishonest conduct "breaches the faith inherent to the work
relationship, ' 49 and whether the conduct "is fundamentally or directly
44. McKinley, supra note 12 at paras 16-26.
45. See, e.g., Regina v Arthurs, Exparte Port Arthur Shipbuilding Co, [ 1967] 2 OR 49 (CA).
46. See, e.g., McPhillips v British Columbia Ferry Corp, [1994] 9 WWR 34 (BCCA).
47. McKinley, supra note 12 at para 48.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
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inconsistent with the employee's obligations to his or her employer."50
However the test is formulated, lacobucci J. explained, it requires an
assessment of the context of the alleged dishonest conduct.
According to Lacobucci J., the principle underlying this contextual
approach is "proportionality."
An effective balance must be struck between the severity of an employee's
misconduct and the sanction imposed. The importance of this balance is
better understood by considering the sense of identity and self-worth
individuals frequently derive from their employment.5'
He then added,
Given this recognition of the integral nature of work to the lives and
identities of individuals in our society, care must be taken in fashioning
rules and principles of law which would enable the employment
relationship to be terminated without notice. The importance of this is
underscored by the power imbalance that this Court has recognized as
ingrained in most facets of the employment relationship. In Wallace, both
the majority and dissenting opinions recognized that such relationships
are typically characterized by unequal bargaining power, which places
employees in a vulnerable position vis-6-vis their employers. It was
further acknowledged that such vulnerability remains in place, and
becomes especially acute, at the time of dismissal.52
To adopt the approach of the British Columbia Court of Appeal and allow
termination for cause in cases where an employee engaged in dishonest
conduct regardless of its degree or the surrounding circumstances,
according to lacobucci J., "would further unjustly augment the power
employers wield within the employment relationship."53 In the end, the
Court concluded that there was no basis upon which to interfere with the
jury's verdict that McKinley's conduct did not give the employer just
cause for his dismissal.54
In McKinley, lacobucci J. justifies the employee's entitlement to
protection against unjust dismissal on the policy grounds of the integral
nature of work to the lives and identities of individuals in our society and
the unequal bargaining power, which places employees in a vulnerable
position vis-A-vis their employers.55 That he turns to these policy
considerations suggests that he viewed the work-for-wages exchange at
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid at para 53.
52. Ibid at para 54 [emphasis in original].
53. Ibid at para 56.
54. Ibid at para 61.
55. Ibid at para 54.
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the heart of the employer-employee relationship as incapable itself of
justifying the employee's right to protection from unjust dismissal.
Justice lacobucci could have instead grounded the common law
doctrine of just cause in the work-for-wages exchange at the core of the
contract of employment. And to a limited extent he did just that, though
he used language that suggests otherwise. On lacobucci J.'s contextual
approach, the question of whether an employee may be dismissed for just
cause is to be determined by reference to the employee's obligations under
the contract. Where an employee is in breach of her obligations under the
contract of employment, the employer is entitled to treat the contract as at
an end and therefore to no longer be under an obligation to provide notice
of termination to the employee. It is the contract of employment, then, that
limits the employer's freedom to dismiss an employee: only where the
employee can be said to have breached a fundamental term of the contract
is the employer entitled to dismiss the employee without notice.
However, on Iacobucci J.'s analysis, it seems that the employee's
right to protection against dismissal without cause or notice does not,
in itself, flow from the contract of employment. On the contextual
approach, the contract of employment serves as the measure of whether
the employee's right to protection against unjust dismissal has been
violated by the employer, but the right itself is instead grounded in the
employee's status as an employee. Justice lacobucci refers to dismissal as
a "sanction" imposed on an employee, implying that dismissal is a kind of
punishment meted out by the employer for malfeasance by the employee.56
The "proportionality" underlying his contextual approach, he explains,
requires that "[a]n effective balance.. .be struck between the severity of an
employee's misconduct and the sanction imposed."57 For him, it seems that
the protection against summary dismissal is a protection that an individual
earns in virtue of her status as an employee because of the integral nature
of work to the individual's sense of identity and because of her inferior
market power, but one that, through her misconduct, she may be denied.
The employee's common law protection against summary dismissal
only calls for the kinds of justifications that lacobucci J. invokes in his
decision in McKinley if one assumes, as it appears lacobucci J. did,
56. Courts and commentators often invoke the language of the criminal law to explain the doctrine
of just cause. Dismissal is often referred to as the 'capital punishment' of employment law. See,
e.g., Re Dwyer and Chrysler Canada Ltd (1978) 20 OR (2d) 207 at 209 (H Ct J). According to
Jennifer Fantini and Randall Echlin, the common law doctrine of just cause holds that "[e]mployers
must ensure that the 'punishment fits the crime."' Jennifer M Fantini & Randall Scott Echlin, "Post-
McKinley: When is Dishonesty Just Cause for Dismissal?" (2002) 18 SCLR (2d) 271 at 271.
57. McKinley, supra note 12 at para 53.
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that the contract of employment itself grants the employer the right to
dismiss the employee without notice and without just cause. But again,
much depends on whether we characterize the protection that employees
enjoy under the common law doctrine of just cause as a benefit or as
the absence of a burden to the employee. The presumption of employer
freedom encourages us to see the employee's common law protection
against dismissal without cause or notice as an extra-contractual benefit-
that is, as one the employee enjoys over and above what she received in
exchange for her promise to work. This is because under the presumption
of employer freedom, the employer's right to set the terms and conditions
under which the work will be performed-the employer's exercise of its
managerial prerogative, in other words-is regarded as limited only by the
express terms of the contract.
To have allowed the employer to dismiss McKinley without notice on
the basis of his alleged dishonesty would have been to grant the employer
the right to unilaterally dictate a term under the contract according to
which (1) the employer would continue to employ McKinley on the
condition that should he take a leave of absence for illness he not withhold
medical information that the employer considers relevant to his ability to
perform the job such that (2) when McKinley failed to do so the employer
was entitled to treat the contract as at an end. Limiting the grounds upon
which an employer is entitled to treat the employment contract as at an
end to those grounds that the common law holds to amount to just cause
for dismissal does not interfere with the employer's contractual right of
managerial prerogative but, instead, respects the conditions under which
managerial prerogative can be said to be a contractual right. Managerial
prerogative can be understood as a contractual right where, as in most
cases, the employee, either expressly or implicitly, agrees that the employer
will enjoy the right to control the work. 8 We can read the Supreme Court's
decision in McKinley as holding that in dismissing McKinley-that is, in
making it a condition of McKinley's employment that he divulge medical
information that the employer considered relevant to his ability to perform
the job-the employer went beyond its right in managerial prerogative to
control the work, by attempting to control not the work, but the worker,
McKinley himself.
Now, of course, in controlling the work, the employer will also in some
sense control the worker herself because the labourer and her labour are
58. The employer's control over the work has traditionally been considered the hallmark of the
contract of employment. See Judy Fudge, Eric Tucker & Leah F Vosko, "Employee or Independent
Contractor? Charting the Legal Significance of the Distinction in Canada" (2003) 10 CLELJ 193.
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inextricably bound together. Labour cannot be separated or alienated from
the worker in the same way that commodities such as a car or money can
be separated from the seller and the purchaser. That labour is inseparable
from the labourer herself gives rise to concerns about the commodification
of labour: where, as under the contract of employment, labour is conceived
of as a commodity, the worker herself is in some sense therefore also a
commodity.59 Thus, while the contract of employment may conceive of
the employment relationship as a wages for work exchange, the exchange
is in some sense a wages-for-the-worker exchange because with the work
comes the worker herself.
However, while work may be inextricably bound up with the worker,
we can nonetheless distinguish between a condition of employment that
seeks to control the work and one that seeks to control the worker herself.60
Under the status-based master and servant relationship, the master enjoyed
the right to control the worker herself, because as Selznick has commented,
"[i]n some vague but important sense, it was assumed that the whole person
was committed to the relation. ' ' 61 A typical agreement between master and
servant included terms preventing the servant from visiting taverns, from
playing cards or dice, from marrying or having sexual relations, and from
leaving the household without the consent of the master.62 The whole of the
servant's person being committed to the relation, the master was entitled
(and indeed even seen as morally obligated) to control (and attend to the
well-being of) the servant herself.
With the relationship's legal transition from status to contract, labour
was reconceived as an alienable commodity 63 and the employment
relationship came to be regarded, if only on the employer's side, as one
of limited commitment. While the master's right to control the servant,
from which the employer's implied right of managerial prerogative was
inherited, was justified by the respective status of master and servant,
managerial prerogative as a contractual right must be justified by the
59. John Nelson asks, "[slince [labour] is not something apart and separate from the worker but is a
commodity, how can we buy it without at the same time buying the worker himself?." John 0 Nelson,
"That a Worker's Labour Cannot be a Commodity" (1995) 70:272 Philosophy 157 at 158.
60. This distinction is akin to Marx's distinction between labour and labour power. On Marx's view,
one can relinquish control over one's labour power, that is, one can alienate one's skills abilities in the
sense that one contracts to give the employer the right to control those skills and abilities for a definite
period. See Guy Robinson, "Labour as Commodity" (1996) 71:275 Philosophy 129 at 130.
61. Selznick, supra note 20 at 124.
62. See Peter Laslett, The World We Have Lost (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971) at 3.
63. As Spiros Simitis puts it, "[c]ommodification marks the step from status to contract": Spiros
Simitis, "The Case of the Employment Relationship: Elements of a Comparison" in Willibald
Steinmetz, ed, Private Lmav and Social Inequality in the Industrial Age (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2000) 181 at 187.
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exchange of promises between employer and employee. Justified in terms
of personal status, the master's right to control the servant was much
broader in scope than the employer's right of control under managerial
prerogative which, under the contract of employment, must be justified by
the employee's promise to submit to the employer's control over the work.
The common law doctrine of just cause can be understood as making an
important contribution to this transition from status to contract. Its role
in contemporary employment law, I suggest, is, in part, to distinguish
between control over the work and control over the worker and to limit
the employer's rights under managerial prerogative to the former such that
managerial prerogative can be derived from the employee's express or
implied promise to submit to the employer's control over the work.
Under contemporary employment law, to establish just cause for an
employee's dismissal without notice an employer must point to conduct
on the part of the employee that is objectively incompatible with the
employee's duties. Conduct considered incompatible with the worker's
status under the master and servant relation (such as visiting taverns,
gambling, entering marriage) is not incompatible with the employee's
duties under a contract of employment, absent some connection between
that conduct and the employee's ability to do the work she has promised
to perform for the employer's benefit.' 4 To establish just cause for
dismissal, which is in effect to allege that the employee has violated an
essential term or condition of employment, entitling the employer to treat
the contract as at an end, the employer must establish that the term or
condition allegedly violated by the employee is one that is connected to
the employee's fulfillment of her promise under the contract. If the term or
condition alleged to have been violated is not connected to the employee's
duties under the contract, then the employer will not have just cause for
dismissal. In other words, where just cause has been found not to exist,
it is as though the employer has been found to have exceeded its right
in managerial prerogative to set terms and conditions of employment, by
dismissing an employee for violating a term or condition of employment
that is not connected to the employee's duties under the contract. A finding
that the employer dismissed an employee without just cause amounts to a
finding that the employer's condition of employment-in McKinley, the
64. In Rhodes v Zehrmart Ltd(1986), 15 CCEL 137 (Ont Div Ct) the fact that an employee purchased
narcotics from a fellow employee outside working hours was found not to amount to just cause for
his summary dismissal, there being no connection between the employee's conduct and his ability to
perform his job. Similarly, in Bell v General Motors of Canada (1989), 27 CCEL 110 (Ont H Ct J) the
fact that the employee had assaulted another worker off company premises was found not to constitute
just cause for dismissal.
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condition that McKinley divulge all medical information that the employer
considered relevant to McKinley's abilities to perform the work-fell
beyond the scope of its contractual right in managerial prerogative to
control the work.
The condition being insufficiently connected to the performance of
the employee's work, it amounts to an attempt not to control the work but
something more than the work. In McKinley, we might say, for example,
that the employer in dismissing McKinley for dishonesty was attempting
to control McKinley by requiring him to be (or at least behave like) the
kind of person who divulges all medical information to his employer, even
where he is not under a duty to do so-a person, more generally, willing
to make himself vulnerable to the judgment of others in their personal
affairs. In agreeing to submit to the employer's control over the work,
McKinley did not also thereby agree to submit to the employer's control
over what kind of person he should be. The decision in McKinley, and
the doctrine of just cause more generally, can thus be seen as limiting the
employer's right in managerial prerogative to the right to control the work
and as denying the employer the right unilaterally to set what counts as
an exercise of that right, at least in cases where the employer exceeds the
scope of managerial prerogative by dismissing an employee for reasons
insufficiently connected to the terms of their agreement.
IV. Extended damages for wrongful dismissal
In Wallace, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the availability
of extended damages to an employee who had been subjected to
particularly harsh or bad faith conduct by his employer upon termination
of employment. Attracted by the employer's offer of secure employment
until retirement and assurances of its fair treatment of employees, Wallace
had left secure employment and accepted a position as a salesperson with
the defendant employer. After 14 years of impeccable service in his new
position, Wallace was dismissed without notice and without explanation.
When he initiated an action for wrongful dismissal, the employer
defended the action on the grounds that the dismissal had been for just
cause, maintaining that position until trial when it then conceded that it
had no basis for the defence. The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada
awarded Wallace damages equal to twelve months' reasonable notice of
termination and an additional twelve months' notice to reflect the callous
and insensitive manner of his dismissal.
Justice Jacobucci, writing for the majority in Wallace, held that the
importance of work and the inferior market power of employees justified
holding employers to what it labeled "an obligation of good faith and fair
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dealing."65 His opinion makes it clear that the duty is not grounded in
principles of private law (having considered and rejected both contract
and tort principles in the course of his reasons), but instead in the unique
features of the contract of employment that "set it apart from the ordinary
commercial contract."66 It seems, then, for lacobucci J., that the contract of
employment, in itself, could not protect an employee from her employer's
unfair or bad faith conduct. Indeed, for him, the contractual of employment
was an obstacle to be overcome in his attempt to reform the common law
rights and duties of employees and employers upon termination of the
relationship.
Only when viewed through the lens of the presumption of employer
freedom, however, does the contract of employment appear to be such an
obstacle. For McLachlin J., writing in dissent, the contract of employment
was not an obstacle to be overcome in holding employers to a duty to
treat employees fairly upon termination but was instead the vehicle
through which that duty could be imposed. The differences between the
majority and dissenting opinions in Wallace, I suggest, can be traced to the
presumption of employer freedom to which the majority, more than the
minority, is clearly committed. Justice McLachlin's dissent also arguably
betrays a hint of the presumption of employer freedom, however, in light
of the particular justifications she favours for holding the employer in
Wallace to the novel duty of good faith and fair treatment.
One of the main issues before the Court was whether Wallace could
claim aggravated and punitive damages for the harsh and insensitive
manner in which his employer terminated his employment. Justice
lacobucci held that there was no basis for either claim, whereas McLachlin
J. would have awarded Wallace $15,000 in aggravated damages. Their
difference of opinion on Wallace's entitlement to aggravated damages
reflects their different views of the contract of employment. Both lacobucci
and McLachlin JJ. followed the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Vorvis
v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia in which the Court held that "any
award of damages beyond compensation for breach of contract for failure
to give reasonable notice of termination 'must be founded on a separately
actionable course of conduct."' 67 For lacobucci J., the employer's conduct
in Wallace gave rise to no independently actionable wrong. Justice
McLachlin disagreed.
65. Wallace, supra note 10 at 95.
66. Ibid at para 91.
67. Vorvis vInsurance Corp of British Columbia, [198911 SCR 1085 at 1103-1104, 1106 [Vorvis].
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Justice lacobucci considered and rejected two candidate independent
wrongs. He gave very short shrift to the appellant's argument that the
employee could sue in tort for "bad faith discharge,"68 citing the absence
of any persuasive authority in support of the introduction of such a novel
cause of action. 69 Justice Lacobucci also considered whether the employer
in this case could be said to have breached an implied contractual term
that the employee would not be dismissed except for cause or legitimate
business reasons or upon reasonable notice of termination.7 ° To hold
employers to such an implied term, he claimed, would "be overly intrusive
and inconsistent with established principles of employment law, and more
appropriately, should be left to legislative enactment rather than judicial
pronouncement."'" Justice Iacobucci thus seems to have been of the
opinion that since the employer did not expressly agree to be bound by a
duty to treat Wallace fairly, it would be "overly intrusive" for the court to
hold the employer to such a duty. In other words, it seems that lacobucci
J. subscribed to the presumption of employer freedom: the employer is
presumed to be under no. obligation to act in good faith and to treat its
employees fairly. In the absence of express agreement to such a term,
the employer is understood to be under no contractual obligation to treat
Wallace fairly upon termination of his employment.
By contrast, McLachlin J. saw no reason why such a term could not
be implied. On the precise basis for the implication of the term, however,
she is ambiguous. At first, she claims that it is "necessary in the sense
that it is required by the nature of the contract rather than the presumed
intentions of the particular parties."72 But she then goes on to cite two
decisions, one of the British Columbia Court of Appeal73 and the other of
the New Zealand High Court,74 in which an implied obligation of fairness
and good faith was found to be implied under a contract of employment on
the basis of the presumed intentions of the parties. In the British Columbia
case, the court held that if the parties had turned their minds to the issue,
they would have mutually agreed that "they would take reasonable steps
to protect each other from such harm, or at least would not deliberately
and maliciously avail themselves of an opportunity to cause it."75 In the
68. Wallace, supra note 10 at paras 75-78; Stacey Reginald Ball, "Bad Faith Discharge" (1994) 39:3
McGill U 568.
69. Wallace, supra note 10 at para 73.
70.: Ibid at para 75.
71. Ibid at para 76.
72. Ibidatpara 137.
73. Deildal v Tod Mountain Development Ltd, [199716 WWR 239 (BC CA) [Deildal].
74. Whelan v Waitaki Meats Ltd, [1991] 2 NZLR 74 (HC) [Whelan].
75. Wallace, supra note 10 at para 139, citing Deildal, supra note 73 at para 77.
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New Zealand case, the High Court held that the employee "was entitled to
assume that he would be treated by his employer in such a manner as to
enable him to retain his dignity. 76
In further support of her view that the employer in Wallace was bound
by an implied term to act fairly and in good faith, McLachlin J. noted that
"implying an employer obligation of good faith would provide symmetry
to this area of the law since employees already owe their employers a duty
to act reasonably in the best interests of their employer,"" and that duties
of good faith and fair dealing have been implied in commercial contracts,
insurance contracts and real estate contracts.78 In the end, McLachlin J.
concluded that the employer's breach of the implied duty of good faith
constituted an independent wrong for which Wallace was entitled to
aggravated damages.79
Unlike lacobucci J., then, McLachlin J. did not view the implication
of a contractual duty requiring the employer to act fairly and in good
faith to be an overly intrusive step. But while she cited cases standing
for the proposition that an employer obligation to act in good faith can
be implied under a contract of employment on the basis of the parties'
presumed intentions, McLachlin J. ultimately justified the implied duty
on the grounds of necessity and fairness. So while she does not see the
contract of employment and the absence of express employer agreement to
be bound by such a duty as obstacles to finding such an implied term under
the contract as lacobucci J. plainly did, it does seem as though McLachlin
J. shares with Lacobucci J. the opinion that the exchange of promises
between employer and employee, on its own, is insufficient to ground the
employer's duty to act in good faith and to treat its employees fairly.
The contract of employment itself can justify an employee's
entitlement to be free from the kind of harsh and insensitive treatment that
Wallace suffered. While the employer in Wallace might not have expressly
agreed that it would be under a duty of good faith and fair treatment, nor
did the employee expressly agree that the employer would enjoy the right
to treat him however the employer pleased, no matter what the cost to
the employee. The presumption of employer freedom, to which it seems
lacobucci J. implicitly subscribed, favours the employer's interests over
the employee's by noting only the absence of express employer agreement
to the duty and not the absence of express agreement by the employee that
76. Whelan, supra note 74 at 89.
77. Wallace, supra note 10 at para 144.
78. Ibidatpara 145.
79. Ibidat para 147.
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the employer would enjoy the right. In the absence of express employer
agreement to be bound by a duty of good faith and fair treatment, the
contract of employment is taken to give the employer the right to act in
bad faith and to treat its employees unfairly. While lacobucci J. regarded
the implication of an employer duty of good faith and fairness to be overly
intrusive on the employer's interests, the absence of such a term is at least
equally intrusive to the employee because its absence effectively imposes
a burden on the employee-the cost of the kind of callous treatment we
see in Wallace-that the employee did not expressly agree to bear.
The employer's duty of good faith and fair dealing upon termination,
for which Wallace has been much applauded for introducing into Canadian
employment law, like the implied term of reasonable notice of termination
and the doctrine of just cause, can thus be understood not as the conferral
of an extra-contractual benefit or protection on employees but instead
as a limit on employer freedom required by the contract of employment
itself. In other words, rather than confer an extra-contractual benefit on
the employee, the employer duty of fair treatment relieves the employee
of an extra-contractual burden and the employer of an extra-contractual
benefit and thus can be grounded in the contractual basis of the employer-
employee relationship.
In Keays, decided ten years after Wallace, and following acobucci J.'s
retirement, the Supreme Court reconsidered so-called Wallace damages.
Keays had been employed by Honda Canada for approximately 11 years
when he was diagnosed with chronic fatigue syndrome in 1997. He ceased
work and received disability benefits until 1998, when Honda's insurer
discontinued his benefits. Following his return to work, Honda exempted
Keays from its absenteeism discipline policy and agreed to permit his
absences on the condition that he produce documentation from a physician
confirming that each absence was related to his disability. When Keays's
absences continued, Honda requested that he attend a medical evaluation
to determine how his disability could be accommodated. On the advice
of his lawyer, Keays refused to meet with the medical expert without an
explanation of the purpose and scope of the requested evaluation. Honda
refused to clarify its request and ultimately terminated Keays' employment
on the grounds of insubordination.
At trial, the termination was found to have been without just cause.
The trial judge awarded Keays 15 months' notice as well as a nine-month
extension of the notice period on the basis of Wallace. The judge also
awarded $500,000 in punitive damages on the basis of the discrimination
and harassment Keays had endured owing to his disability. The Ontario
Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment in all respects, except for the
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amount of punitive damages. The Court ofAppeal agreed with'the 15-month
notice period and the award of nine months of Wallace damages. However,
while the Court of Appeal found that an award of punitive damages was
warranted in this case, they reduced the trial judge's award to $100,000,
stating that some of the trial judge's findings of fact were not supported
by the evidence.
At the Supreme Court of Canada, Bastarache J., writing for the
majority, upheld the lower courts' finding that Keays' dismissal was
without just cause. While upholding the award of 15 months reasonable
notice, the majority ruled that there was no factual basis for either the
award of Wallace damages or the award of punitive damages. In assessing
the claim for damages for mental distress, Bastarache J. explained that
traditionally in accordance with the House of Lords' 1909 decision in Addis
v. Gramophone Ltd.,8° damages for wrongful dismissal have been confined
to the losses flowing from the employer's failure to give adequate notice
and have not included compensation for the pain and distress experienced
by the employee consequent upon the termination of her employment. The
Supreme Court had confirmed this rule in its 1966 decision in Peso Silver
Mines Ltd. v. Cropper,8 and then again in 1989 in Vorvis.82 In Vorvis, the
Court left open the possibility of an award of damages for mental distress
in a wrongful dismissal case where the defendant employer's conduct was
"independently actionable."83 In Wallace, recall, lacobucci J. followed the
approach in Vorvis, and finding the employer's conduct to not give rise to
an independently actionable wrong, rejected the possibility of either an
implied contractual duty of good faith and a tort of bad faith.
Almost ten years after Wallace, as Bastarache J. explains in Keays,
the Court held in an insurance case, Fidler v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of
Canada,84 that it was no longer necessary to establish an independent
actionable wrong to ground a claim for damages for mental distress for
breach of contract. Such damages, the Court held in Fidler, are recoverable
under the well-established principle in Hadley v. Baxendale-that is, where
the damages alleged are "such as may fairly and reasonably be considered
as either arising naturally... from such breach of contract itself, or such as
may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both
parties."85 In Keays, Bastarache J. adopted the Hadley approach which,
80. Addis v. Gramophone Co Ltd, [1909] AC 488 (HL Eng).
81. Peso Silver Mines Ltd v Cropper, [1966] SCR 673.
82. Vorvis, supra note 67.
83. Ibidat 1103.
84. Fidler v Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada, 2006 SCC 30, [2006] 2 SCR 3 [Fidler].
85. Hadley v Baxendale (1854), 156 ER 145 at 151 (Exch Ct) [Hadley].
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he explained, requires the Court, when faced with a claim for damages
for mental distress damages in a wrongful dismissal case, as in any other
breach of contract case, to "begin by asking what was contemplated by the
parties at the tine of the formation of the contract...'what did the contract
promise?' 8 6 Since the time of the decision in Wallace, he stated, there
has been an expectation by both employers and employees that employers
will act in good faith in the manner of dismissal. On the Hadley principle,
an employer's failure to do so can lead to foreseeable, compensable
damages.87 Justice Bastarache made it clear that these damages are to
take the form of ordinary contract damages, not an extension to the notice
period as lacobucci J. had done in Wallace:
Damages attributable to conduct in the manner of dismissal are always
to be awarded under the Hadley principle. Moreover, in cases where
damages are awarded, no extension of the notice period is to be used to
determine the proper amount to be paid.... [I]f the employee can prove
that the manner of dismissal caused mental distress that was in the
contemplation of the parties, those damages will be awarded not through
an arbitrary extension of the notice period, but through an award that
reflects the actual damages.88
While in the end, the Court dismissed Keays's claim for damages for mental
distress on the facts of the case, its recasting of the sui generis Wallace
damages in terms of ordinary contract damages under the long-standing
Hadley principle reveals that the contract of employment itself can do the
work that lacobucci J. sought to achieve in Wallace on extra-contractual
grounds. In Wallace, lacobucci J. had justified the award of compensation
for the bad faith dismissal not on the basis of Wallace's contractual rights
or the employer's contractual duties-indeed, recall, for Iacobucci J.,
the implication of an employer duty of good faith was too intrusive, and
something better left to the legislature-but instead on the special nature
of employment, its importance to the individual and to society, and on
the general vulnerability of employees particularly upon termination of
employment. Both the contract-based approach in Keays and the policy-
based decision in Wallace allow an employee to seek additional damages
on the grounds of the manner in which she was dismissed. The contract-
based approach in Keays merely translates the sui generis policy-based
Wallace damages into ordinary contract damages which rest on proof of a
reasonably foreseeable loss (rather than on the severity of the employer's
86. Keays, supra note 15 at para 56.
87. lbid at para 58.
88. Ibidatpara 59.
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misconduct in and of itself) and are to be measured based on the extent of
the loss (rather than an arbitrary extension of the notice period.)
Keays has been applauded for eliminating Wallace damages from the
remedial landscape in wrongful dismissal law, 9 and given the numerous
conceptual and practical problems to which Wallace damages gave rise,90
the applause is, in my view, merited. And yet, while, as I have argued,
Keays reveals the potential that the contract of employment holds as the
basis for important employee rights such as the right to be free of harsh and
unfair dismissal, the decision in Keays still implicitly depends upon the
policy-based Wallace decision. The Court in Keays did not directly revisit
the question of whether an employer is contractually bound to refrain
from bad faith conduct upon dismissal, a development that lacobucci J.
resisted in Wallace on the grounds that such an implied term was overly
intrusive, but instead merely reformulated the damages that lacobucci J.
had held, on extra-contractual grounds, to be available to an employee in
such a case. Even if satisfaction of the Hadley principle-that is, a finding
that the losses flowing from employer bad faith conduct were reasonably
foreseeable at the time of contract formation-is tantamount to a finding
that it was an implied term that the employer would refrain from such
conduct or else pay damages for the consequent losses, the Court's use of
the contract-based Hadley principle in Keays still appears to ultimately
rest upon the policy-based decision in Wallace, since for Bastarache J.
it seems that it is Wallace itself that makes it a reasonable expectation
of employer and employee that the employer will refrain from bad faith
conduct upon dismissal:
In Wallace, the Court held "employers to an obligation of good faith and
fair dealing in the manner of dismissal"... and created the expectation
that, in the course of dismissal, employers would be "candid, reasonable,
honest and forthright with their employees...." At least since that time,
then, there has been expectation by both parties to the contract that
employers will act in good faith in the manner of dismissal.9'
Thus, while Keays represents a move away from lacobucci J.'s policy-
based approach towards a contract-based approach to the employment
relationship, it is arguably still lacobucci J.'s invocation of policy, and
not the contract of employment, in which the employee's right to be free
from harsh and bad faith dismissal is ultimately grounded. For this reason,
89. See, for example, Paul-Erik Veel, "Clarity and Confusion in Employment Law Remedies: A
Comment on Honda Canada Inc v Keays" (2009) 67:1 UT Fac L Rev 135.
90. Wallace, supra note 10.
91. Keays, supra note 15 at para 58 [citations omitted].
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Keays represents a missed opportunity to challenge the presumption of
employer freedom that seems to have steered lacobucci J. towards policy,
rather than contract, in holding the employer to that obligation of good
faith and fair dealing upon dismissal.
Conclusion
A common law action for wrongful dismissal represents a claim that the
employer has breached the contract of employment and that damages are
owed to the ermployee as a result of that breach. At the core of the contract
of employment, as with any other contractual relationship, is an exchange
between the parties. My aim in this paper has been to ground the employee's
basic common law entitlements under Canadian employment law in that
exchange. While the legal recognition of those entitlements-to an implied
right of reasonable notice of termination, to protection against summary
dismissal, and to compensation where losses flow from an employer's
bad faith conduct-is justifiable on grounds of the special nature of
employment, its importance to the individual and to society, and grounds
of the general vulnerability of workers particularly upon termination of an
employment relationship, these same entitlements can also be grounded,
as I have argued, directly in the work-for-wages exchange at the core of
the contract of employment. The presumption of employer freedom, I have
argued, has tainted our view of the contract of employment in a way that
threatens to make the employee's basic contractual rights appear instead
as extra-contractual entitlements, justifiable only on policy grounds on the
basis of the individual's status as a (potentially vulnerable) worker. This
view in turn fuels the concern that the judicial recognition of employee
entitlements threatens the sanctity of the contract of employment and the
employer's freedom of contract.
In this paper I have urged a second look at the contract of employment-
the "corner-stone" of the modern employment relationship---as the source
of the employee's common law rights. Once we rid the common law of
what I have called the presumption of employer freedom, we can see in the
contract of employment not a source of worker oppression to be remedied
by legislative or judicial act, but the very foundation of the employee's
common law entitlements and protections.
